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This section provides the details of ultimatum game analysis. First, we report the de-
tection of the discontinuous jump at the equal-split offer. In addition to piecewise linear
regressions, we also add quadratic terms for robustness. Secondly, we compare our data
with Roth et al. (1991, RPOZ) by conducting the analysis of both data sets. In the third
subsection, we report the OLS regression results for proposal offers when controlling for
different scenarios and demographic variables. In the fourth subsection, we analyze the
players’ reaction time, finding a drastic drop in the time Responders take to make their
decisions when they face the equal-split offer, i.e., 50 out of 100. Finally, we plot the
distributions of proposal offers and the conditional acceptance rates of all ten different
regions.
Supplementary Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptive statistics for our ultimatum game
data. We summarize the configurations (pie size and number of periods) and players’
performance in different subgroups.
Supplementary Table 1: Game configurations.
# Pairs Mean SD Min Max
Pie size 6,505 111.6 293.0 5 5,000
Total periods 6,505 1.615 1.810 1 20
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Supplementary Table 2: Proposal offer and acceptance rate.
Proposal offer Acceptance rate
N Mean SD Mean SD
Overall 10,507 36.82 18.16 0.640 0.480
Country
US North East 1,431 36.32 18.16 0.628 0.484
US Midwest 925 36.97 16.78 0.685 0.465
US South 2,970 36.93 18.80 0.649 0.477
US West 2,419 38.02 17.43 0.647 0.478
Canada 1,057 37.58 19.65 0.667 0.472
Spain 562 31.19 15.34 0.532 0.499
England 571 37.81 16.63 0.576 0.495
Singapore 226 34.70 21.96 0.628 0.484
Japan 209 38.82 18.65 0.660 0.475
China 137 31.38 17.44 0.635 0.483
Type of school
University 9,362 36.64 18.37 0.633 0.482
Liberal arts college 688 36.44 17.73 0.688 0.464
Community college 207 42.99 12.38 0.739 0.440
High school 250 39.52 13.82 0.708 0.456
Type of funding
Private school 2,986 36.61 18.12 0.659 0.474
Public school 7,521 36.91 18.18 0.632 0.482
Type of class
Principles of econ 2,441 38.91 16.84 0.637 0.481
Intermediate micro 1,110 38.58 18.20 0.694 0.461
Exp. / Behav. econ 2,692 37.77 19.24 0.664 0.472
Management / Finance 938 35.88 17.93 0.630 0.483
Game theory 2,600 33.31 18.24 0.596 0.491
Political economy 162 34.67 16.23 0.605 0.490
Other classes 564 38.19 16.31 0.663 0.473
Time
Morning 4,332 37.04 17.29 0.653 0.476
Afternoon 6,175 36.67 18.73 0.631 0.483
2
A.1 The Detection of Discontinuous Jump
In this subsection, we provide the estimation results of the discontinuous jump. In order
to check whether there is a discontinuous jump at the 50% offer, we generate the dummy
variable “fifty or greater”. Moreover, to check if there is a behavioral difference between
one-shot games and repeated games, we generate another dummy variable “one-shot”.
The piecewise linear regression results are summarized in Supplementary Table 3.
From the first two specifications, we can see that the size of the discontinuous jump
is 21.4% (p < 0.001) on average (Supplementary Figure 1a). When we consider data
from one-shot and repeated games separately, we observe that the discontinuous jump in
repeated games and one-shot games are 26.2% and 16.3%, respectively (both p < 0.001;
Supplementary Figure 1b).
We also adopt a quadratic specification (shown in the last two columns) which esti-
mates a 16.6% discontinuous jump (Supplementary Figure 1c). Estimating the discon-
tinuous jump in one-shot games and repeated games separately, we note a 10.6% jump
in one-shot games, and a 21.8% jump in repeated games (Supplementary Figure 1d).
Instead of a quadratic specification, we could also further separate out offers of 50%
and run a three-part linear regression. We obtain nearly identical discontinuous jumps
immediately before 50%, but insignificant drops immediately after. In particular, there
is a discontinuous jump of 21.7% (p < 0.001) at 50%, but an insignificant drop of 2.68%
(p = 0.171) after 50% (Supplementary Figure 1e). We obtain discontinuous jumps of
16.5% (p < 0.001) for one-shot games and 26.5% (p < 0.001) for repeated games at 50%,
and insignificant drops of 2.57% (p = 0.188) for one-shot games and 1.78% (p = 0.557)
for repeated games after 50% (Supplementary Figure 1f).
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Supplementary Table 3: The estimation results of the discontinuous jump.
Acceptance rate (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.213 0.228 0.258 0.272
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[0.178, 0.247] [0.169, 0.287] [0.222, 0.293] [0.214, 0.331]
Offer 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.453)
[0.009, 0.011] [0.007, 0.010] [0.000, 0.007] [−0.003, 0.007]
Offer2 0.00014 0.00013
(0.000) (0.021)
[7.1e-5, 2.1e-4] [2.0e-5, 2.4e-4]
Fifty or greater 0.791 0.717 1.224 1.087
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[0.724, 0.859] [0.619, 0.814] [0.779, 1.670] [0.480, 1.693]
Offer × Fifty or greater −0.012 −0.009 −0.019 −0.015
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.144)
[−0.013,−0.010] [−0.011,−0.007] [−0.034,−0.005] [−0.035, 0.005]
Offer2 × Fifty or greater −0.00004 −0.00004
(0.540) (0.637)
[−1.6e-4, 8.3e-5] [−2.3e-4, 1.4e-4]
One-shot −0.030 −0.027
(0.376) (0.444)
[−0.098, 0.037] [−0.095, 0.042]
One-shot × Offer 0.003 0.002
(0.000) (0.446)
[0.002, 0.005] [−0.004, 0.009]
One-shot × Offer2 0.00002
(0.723)
[−1.1e-4, 1.6e-4]
One-shot × Fifty or greater 0.138 0.178
(0.044) (0.686)
[0.004, 0.272] [−0.686, 1.041]
One-shot × Offer × Fifty or greater −0.005 −0.005
(0.002) (0.718)
[−0.008,−0.002] [−0.033, 0.027]
One-shot × Offer2 × Fifty or greater −0.00001
(0.904)
[−2.5e-4, 2.2e-4]
Discontinuous jump (Overall) 0.214 0.166
(0.000) (0.000)
[0.184, 0.244] [0.128, 0.203]
Discontinuous jump (One-shot) 0.163 0.106
(0.000) (0.000)
[0.133, 0.192] [0.068, 0.143]
Discontinuous jump (Repeated) 0.262 0.218
(0.000) (0.000)
[0.208, 0.317] [0.151, 0.286]
R-Squared 0.234 0.242 0.237 0.245
Observations 10,507 10,507 10,507 10,507
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the session level (# of clusters is 490). P -values are shown in
parentheses and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) appear below the p-values. Moreover, we adopt the Wald









































































































Supplementary Figure 1: Visualization of the discontinuous jumps (N = 10, 507).
(a) Specification (1). (b) Specification (2). (c) Specification (3). (d) Specification (4).
(e) “Three-part” linear specification: Full data. (f) “Three-part” linear specification: One-
Shot vs. repeated.
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A.2 Comparison between MobLab Data and RPOZ
In this subsection, we compare our data with the RPOZ data by conducting the same
analysis. The results of RPOZ are reproduced in Supplementary Figure 2cd. General
patterns of both offer amounts and acceptance rates of our data are quite similar to
RPOZ with the exception of low offers (which are made and accepted more often) and
the sharp discontinuity at 50%. Approximately 8.5% (890 out of 10,507 observations) of
the offers are at the equilibrium prediction of the smallest amount or zero, compared to
only 0.3% (four out of 1,260 observations) in RPOZ. Moreover, the acceptance rate for
































































Supplementary Figure 2: Proposal offers and acceptance rates in the MobLab data (N =
10, 507) and RPOZ data (N = 1, 260). (a) The histogram of proposal offers in one-shot
games (NO = 5, 407) and repeated games (with a fixed partner protocol, NR = 5, 100).
(b) The average acceptance rate for different proposal offer levels, and a piecewise linear
regression allowing a discontinuous change at 50%. The size of the dots represents the
frequency of each offer amount. (cd) The histogram of proposal offers in RPOZ, and their
average acceptance rates.
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A.3 Proposal Offer Regression Analysis
In this subsection, we report OLS regression results for proposal offers (in percentages).
Besides geo-demographic dummy variables, we also control for different scenarios such
as one-shot games and different rounds in repeated games. Moreover, since Proposers
are only allowed to make proposal offers in integers, they are forced to round up their
proposal offers when the pie size is small. Therefore, we include a dummy variable for
small pie size (≤ 20) to control the effect of a more discrete choice set.
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Supplementary Table 4: Proposal offer regression.
Proposal offer (%) Coef. Std. err. p-value [95% CI]
Constant 40.039 (1.285) 0.000 37.515 42.564
One-shot −0.884 (0.718) 0.219 −2.295 0.527
First round of repeated game −1.031 (0.799) 0.197 −2.601 0.538
Last round of repeated game −0.757 (0.702) 0.281 −2.137 0.622
Small pie (pie size ≤ 20) 4.273 (1.051) 0.000 2.208 6.339
US North East Reference group
US Midwest −0.223 (1.333) 0.867 −2.842 2.395
US South −1.604 (1.068) 0.134 −3.702 0.494
US West −0.707 (1.004) 0.482 −2.680 1.267
Canada 0.194 (1.173) 0.869 −2.111 2.499
Spain −3.151 (2.355) 0.182 −7.778 1.477
England −1.400 (2.411) 0.562 −6.138 3.338
Singapore −3.182 (2.429) 0.191 −7.955 1.590
Japan 0.711 (1.857) 0.702 −2.937 4.359
China −5.810 (2.691) 0.031 −11.098 −0.522
University Reference group
Liberal arts college −0.697 (1.170) 0.552 −2.996 1.602
Community college 2.794 (3.591) 0.437 −4.262 9.851
High school 2.161 (2.607) 0.407 −2.961 7.283
Private school Reference group
Public school 0.852 (0.900) 0.344 −0.916 2.620
Principles of econ Reference group
Intermediate micro −0.399 (1.296) 0.758 −2.944 2.147
Exp. / Behav. econ −2.035 (0.869) 0.020 −3.742 −0.327
Management / Finance −3.227 (1.565) 0.040 −6.303 −0.152
Game theory −5.806 (1.122) 0.000 −8.011 −3.602
Political economy −5.163 (1.411) 0.000 −7.935 −2.392
Other classes −1.528 (1.411) 0.279 −4.300 1.243
Morning Reference group
Afternoon −0.552 (0.713) 0.440 −1.953 0.850
R-Squared 0.0259
Observations 10,507
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the session level (# of clusters is 490).
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A.4 Reaction Time Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze the Responders’ and Proposers’ RT. To control for experi-
ence effects, we divide the data into four different scenarios: “one-shot game,” “repeated
game first round,” “repeated game non-last round” and “repeated game last round.” Sup-
plementary Table 5 shows the summary statistics. To ensure our analysis is not skewed
by extreme values, we drop 315 observations (3% of 10,507 observations) that take more
than 44 seconds (= Q3 + 3× IQR in the one-shot data) to respond.
In Supplementary Figure 3, we plot the LOWESS estimation (together with binned
scatter plots) of Responders’ reaction times for different proposal offers. In the one-shot
game scenario, we find an inverted-U shape for RT when the offer increases from 20%
to 50% and the acceptance rate increases from 40% to 75%. This population-level result
is consistent with the individual results of Krajbich et al. (2014) that find 16 out of 18
subjects have their average RT peak at the offer for which they are indifferent when
acceptance decisions are elicited three to five times for four different offers: 20%, 30%,
40%, and 50%. We also observe a sharp drop in reaction time at exactly 50% in all
scenarios. For instance, in the one-shot game scenario, Responders’ average reaction
time is about 10.7 seconds when they encounter a 49% offer. Yet, it only takes them 7.1
seconds to respond when they are facing an equal-split offer.
Next, we turn to analyze Proposers’ reaction time. Proposers make their decisions
based on the expected acceptance rate of different proposal offers. Therefore, here we
analyze the relationship between Proposers’ reaction time and the expected payoff. To
ensure that our analysis not to be skewed by outliers, we exclude 182 observations (1.7%
of 10,507 observations) that take more than 98 seconds (again, the number given by
Q3 + 3× IQR in the one-shot data). Our results are plotted in Supplementary Figure 4.
Intuitively, the higher expected payoff means the proposal offer is more attractive to the
Proposer. Therefore, the Proposer should take shorter reaction time to make the decision.
From the graph, we can observe this decreasing pattern in one-shot games and the first
round of repeated games. This trend is not obvious in other periods of repeated games.
9
Supplementary Table 5: Responders’ reaction times (s).
Experience level N Mean Q1 Median Q3
One-shot 5,407 34.60 4 7 14
Repeated game: First round 1,098 10.90 4 6 12
Repeated game: Last round 1,098 7.46 2 4 7
Repeated game: Non-last round 2,904 6.40 2 4 7

































































































Supplementary Figure 3: The LOWESS estimation and binned scatter plot of Responders’
reaction time (shown in green; left axis) and piecewise linear regression of acceptance
rate (shown in red; right axis). N = 10, 192 after excluding ouliers. (a) One-shot (NO =
5, 182). (b) Repeated game, first round (NRF = 1, 066). (c) Repeated game, last round
(NRL = 1, 071). (d) Repeated game, non-last round (NRN = 2, 873).
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Supplementary Table 6: Proposer’ reaction times (s).
Experience level N Mean Q1 Median Q3
One-shot 5,407 28.58 14 22 35
Repeated game: First round 1,098 27.84 13 21 34
Repeated game: Last round 1,098 16.77 5 9 15
Repeated game: Non-last round 2,904 11.44 5 8 13





































































Supplementary Figure 4: The LOWESS estimation of Proposers’ expected payoff and
reaction time. N = 10, 325 after excluding ouliers. (a) One-shot (NO = 5, 284). (b) Re-
peated game, first round (NRF = 1, 074). (c) Repeated game, last round (NRL = 1, 074).
(d) Repeated game, non-last round (NRN = 2, 893).
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A.5 Data from Ten Different Geographic Regions
In this subsection, we break down the data into ten different geographic regions and in-
vestigate whether there is a distributional difference across ten different regions as well
as whether the discontinuity jump is common in these ten different regions. Supplemen-
tary Figure 5 plots the distributions of the proposal offer and the acceptance rate at the
same time. Basically, we can first see that the patterns of acceptance rate are similar
across different regions—the discontinuity is significantly detected everywhere, ranging
from 15.2% in US North East to 30.5% in England.
On the other hand, the distributions of proposal offers share similarities but also
contain some differences across regions. First of all, except for Spain, there is a very
high frequency of equal-split proposal offers. In addition, there are spikes at multiples
of tens which are focal points. However, some other features vary across regions. For
instance, the proportion of equilibrium proposal offers ranges from 4.8% in Spain to 15.5%
in Singapore. In the last section, we do meta-analysis to quantify the between-country









































































































































































































China (N = 137)j
Supplementary Figure 5: Proposal offers and acceptance rates in each country/region
(N = 10, 507). The density of proposal offer is shown by the vertical axis on the left and
the acceptance rate is presented by the vertical axis on the right. See Supplementary
Table 2 for descriptive statistics.
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A.6 Incentives in Ultimatum Game
In this section, we investigate whether the incentive schemes in different classes lead to
heterogeneity in our Ultimatum Game results. Among 10,507 observations, we found the
syllabi for 1,772 observations (58 sessions out of 490 sessions). Using the syllabi, we can
categorize the sessions into four types: no incentive, participation, course points and real
money.
If the syllabus mentions that the performance in classroom experiments will be part
of the grade, we categorize the corresponding session into course points. If the students
are just required to participate in a certain number of experiments, we will categorize
it as participation. We classify the sessions into real money if the payment rules are
specified in the syllabus. Finally, if a class with a syllabus does not belong to any of the
categories above, we label the session as no incentive. The summary statistics based on
this classification are reported in Supplementary Table 7.
To check whether our results are robust to different incentive structures, we breakdown
our data into four different incentive schemes. From Supplementary Tables 8 and 9 and
Supplementary Figure 6, we can see that except for real money incetivized data, the
distributions of offers are very similar across different incentive schemes. Multiples of ten
are focal, and the equal-split allocation is the most common outcome. The patterns of
acceptance rates are also similar across different incentive structures.
However, the (limited amount of) real money incentives led to proposal offers that were
considerably greater with a mean of 47 (compared to 36 without monetary incentives),
and almost triples the size of the mode on equal split. The acceptance rate, accordingly,
rises substantially with monetary stakes. This suggests a pattern that could be consistent
with earlier studies (such as Forsythe et al., 1994) that documented significant impacts of
monetary stakes under more controlled conditions. In addition, the discontinuous jump
at exactly 50 is detected for all cases except for the real money one, but that is likely
due to the instructor choosing a pie size of 10 (prohibiting the 49-50 comparison to be
observable) and a small sample size. In any case, the statistical difference in estimated
discontinuity for real money classes vs. others is not conclusively different. Moreover, we
can observe that the acceptance rates of zero offers is estimated to be around 15-25% for
all incentive types including real money.
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Supplementary Table 7: The number of observations under different incentive schemes
and demographic variables.
No No Course Real
syllabus incentive Participation points money
Overall 8, 735 756 553 355 108
Country
US North East 1, 431 0 0 0 0
US Midwest 925 0 0 0 0
US South 2, 215 0 553 94 108
US West 1, 917 241 0 261 0
Canada 1, 057 0 0 0 0
Spain 562 0 0 0 0
England 160 411 0 0 0
Singapore 226 0 0 0 0
Japan 105 104 0 0 0
China 137 0 0 0 0
Type of school
University 7, 944 515 553 350 0
Liberal arts college 580 0 0 0 108
Community college 202 0 0 5 0
High school 9 241 0 0 0
Type of funding
Private school 2, 548 241 0 89 108
Public school 6, 187 515 553 266 0
Type of class
Principle of econ 2, 025 411 0 5 0
Intermediate micro 934 0 0 176 0
Exp. / Behav. econ 1, 906 104 413 161 108
Management / Finance 798 0 140 0 0
Game theory 2, 346 241 0 13 0
Political economy 162 0 0 0 0
Other classes 564 0 0 0 0
Time
Morning 3, 524 612 147 11 38
Afternoon 5, 211 144 406 344 70
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Supplementary Table 8: Proposal offer and acceptance rate under different incentive
schemes.
No No Course Real
syllabus incentive Participation points money
Proposal offer 36.51 38.56 39.17 34.00 47.22
(17.94) (14.59) (23.13) (20.24) (16.96)
Acceptance rate 0.637 0.638 0.618 0.673 0.917
(0.481) (0.481) (0.486) (0.470) (0.278)
# of observations 8,735 756 553 355 108
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
Supplementary Table 9: The estimation results of the discontinuous jump under different
incentive schemes.
Acceptance rate No incentive Participation Course points Real money
Constant 0.152 0.154 0.256 0.185
(0.035) (0.012) (0.126) (0.326)
[0.014, 0.291] [0.037, 0.270] [−0.092, 0.604] [−0.205, 0.576]
Offer 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.017
(0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.001)
[0.008, 0.014] [0.007, 0.016] [0.002, 0.020] [0.008, 0.026]
Fifty or greater 0.790 0.731 0.744 0.815
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
[0.594, 0.985] [0.481, 0.982] [0.396, 1.092] [0.424, 1.205]
Offer × Fifty or greater −0.010 −0.011 −0.011 −0.017
(0.000) (0.001) (0.020) (0.001)
[−0.015,−0.006] [−0.017,−0.005] [−0.020,−0.002] [−0.026,−0.008]
Discontinuity jump 0.271 0.163 0.199 −0.056
(0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.652)
[0.206, 0.337] [0.067, 0.258] [0.077, 0.320] [−0.314, 0.203]
R-Squared 0.236 0.261 0.315 0.439
Observation 756 533 355 108
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the session level. P -values are shown in parentheses and 95% con-
fidence intervals (CIs) appear below the p-values. Moreover, we adopt the Wald test for the significance


















































































Supplementary Figure 6: Proposal offers and acceptance rates under different incentive
structures (No incentive: N = 756; participation: N = 553; course credit: N = 355; real
money: N = 108). The density of proposal offer is shown by the vertical axis on the left
and the acceptance rate is presented by the vertical axis on the right. See Supplementary
Table 8 for descriptive statistics.
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B Double Auction
In this section, we provide details of our analysis for the buyer-seller double auction. We
first report the full regression table of within-period price convergence. Furthermore,
we analyze how the market would converge if the market were played multiple periods
by estimating the exponential convergence model. In addition, we describe the theories
and predictions of price dynamics and the corresponding descriptive statistics of relevant
correlation coefficients in the third and fourth section. Lastly, we break down the data
into different periods to analyze how multiple rounds affect market outcomes.
One market session was excluded due to an average efficiency level of −4092.0% caused
by an input error when demonstrating the effect of a supply shift using the fairly normal
supply-demand schedule of Supplementary Figure 7a. By mistyping “136” as “1136” when
entering the maximum seller cost, the instructor created a 50-player market with an equi-
librium quantity of merely 2 units (Supplementary Figure 7b). This extraordinary setting
resulted in an average of 0.08 equilibrium trades per player, much lower than all other
markets (with at least 0.4 trades per player). With little or no financial consequences for
trading at a loss, excessive extra-marginal trades occurred that led to negative efficiency
levels in all nine periods, ranging from −1685.1% to −6219.1%.
We summarize our double auction data in Supplementary Tables 10 and 11. In
the first table, we provide aggregate market information such as the experience of the
players in the market and the configurations. In the second table, we provide descriptive
statistics on market performance, including mean error deviation (δ), Smith’s alpha (α),
and efficiency (E) in different subgroups.
We also provide the detailed information of top 10 market configurations in Supple-
mentary Table 12. We count the number of configurations at the market level. We can






















Supplementary Figure 7: (a) The intended supply-demand schedule to illustrate the effect
of a supply shift. (b) The extreme schedule from a supply shift where 1136 (instead of
136) was entered as maximum seller cost. This resulted in numerous dominated trades
and negative efficiency levels, something rarely seen when subjects are incentivized with
financial rewards.
Supplementary Table 10: Market information.
Market information # markets Mean SD Median Min Max
# of players 5,809 14.11 15.43 10 2 318
Non-robot experience 5,809 2.529 2.781 1.7 0 32.33
Robot experience 5,809 0.245 0.634 0 0 11.67
Total periods 5,809 1.553 0.959 1 1 10
Welfare index 5,809 0.188 0.111 0.231 0 0.901
Notes: (Non-robot experience) The average number of trading periods that the players played with
only humans before this market starts. (Robot experience) The average number of periods that the
players played in the market including robot players before this market starts. (Welfare index) w =
|Πc −Πp|/(Πc + Πp), where Πc and Πp are the total consumer and producer surplus. We construct this
variable to control for the configuration.
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Supplementary Table 11: Market performance.
δ̄ α E
N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Overall 9, 023 0.070 0.280 0.279 0.294 0.815 0.258
Country
US North East 1, 038 0.044 0.203 0.234 0.204 0.824 0.167
US Midwest 881 0.063 0.244 0.290 0.286 0.803 0.230
US South 2, 547 0.041 0.301 0.248 0.336 0.811 0.385
US West 2, 218 0.021 0.200 0.264 0.204 0.822 0.196
Canada 1, 664 0.209 0.377 0.393 0.374 0.836 0.143
Spain 28 −0.058 0.258 0.274 0.199 0.860 0.228
England 320 0.041 0.130 0.210 0.162 0.727 0.156
Singapore 44 −0.005 0.128 0.201 0.139 0.780 0.166
Japan 248 0.055 0.200 0.238 0.208 0.753 0.238
China 35 0.066 0.098 0.136 0.068 0.848 0.163
Type of school
University 8, 368 0.074 0.285 0.279 0.299 0.812 0.264
Liberal arts college 523 0.010 0.161 0.243 0.178 0.864 0.149
Community college 65 0.069 0.426 0.534 0.353 0.695 0.259
High school 67 −0.063 0.184 0.272 0.196 0.885 0.135
Type of funding
Private school 1, 769 0.026 0.196 0.233 0.213 0.810 0.450
Public school 7, 254 0.080 0.296 0.290 0.309 0.816 0.183
Type of class
Principles of econ 6, 490 0.074 0.262 0.279 0.266 0.816 0.273
Intermediate micro 1, 045 0.080 0.426 0.314 0.472 0.814 0.242
Intermediate macro 249 0.024 0.247 0.268 0.253 0.817 0.187
Exp. / Behav. econ 437 0.037 0.187 0.218 0.197 0.800 0.210
Management / Finance 452 0.051 0.234 0.263 0.265 0.791 0.216
Game theory 20 −0.057 0.226 0.295 0.175 0.814 0.216
Political economy 2 0.766 0.701 1.030 0.433 0.605 0.047
Other classes 328 0.048 0.214 0.272 0.220 0.838 0.144
Time
Morning 783 0.072 0.330 0.321 0.361 0.789 0.334
Afternoon 8, 240 0.069 0.275 0.275 0.286 0.817 0.250
Note: Mean error deviation is defined as δ̄ = (
∑J
j=1 δj)/J , which is the average standardized price
difference.
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Supplementary Table 12: Top 10 market configurations.
# of # of # goods Max Min Max Min EQ EQ
Count buyers sellers per trader value value cost cost price quantity
2,090 5 5 3 150 108 120 50 112 13
188 5 5 3 126 70 82 54 78 13
185 5 5 2 150 78 124 25 96 7
170 5 5 3 185 45 75 5 65 13
159 5 5 3 125 83 120 50 96 10
106 10 10 3 150 121 108 50 114 30
104 5 5 3 146 104 120 50 110 13
89 8 8 3 150 104 119 50 110 21
76 10 10 3 1000 100 1000 100 550 15
74 5 5 3 170 100 120 50 110 13
Note: We count the configurations at the market level. For instance, the first row is the default config-
uration that there are 2,090 markets (out of 5,809 markets) adopt this configuration.
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B.1 Within-Period Convergence
We follow Noussair et al. (1995) to estimate the convergence of price within a transaction
period:
yit = (1/t)Xi · β1 + (1− 1/t)β2 + εit
where i indicates the particular market period, t represents time as measured by the
transaction order, Xi contains the information about that market period, and β1 charac-
terizes the origin of the dynamic process. Note that β2 is the asymptote of the dependent
variable.
We take a standardized price difference, which is the difference in the transaction price
and the equilibrium price divided by the equilibrium price, as the dependent variable.
Supplementary Table 13 shows that prices initially are 15.3% higher than equilibrium
prices, but eventually, drop to only 1.7% higher. This shows strong convergence within
the period.
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Supplementary Table 13: Estimation result of within-period price convergence.
Coef. Std. err. p-value [95% CI]
Initial price variation
Constant 0.153 (0.075) 0.041 0.006 0.299
Non-robot experience 0.013 (0.004) 0.003 0.004 0.021
Robot experience 0.011 (0.018) 0.551 −0.025 0.047
Period −0.010 (0.009) 0.263 −0.028 0.008
Welfare index −3.477 (1.026) 0.001 −5.489 −1.465
Welfare index Sq. 11.745 (3.317) 0.000 5.239 18.250
# of players −0.001 (0.001) 0.190 −0.003 0.001
US North East Reference group
US Midwest 0.100 (0.054) 0.067 −0.007 0.206
US South −0.048 (0.041) 0.241 −0.128 0.032
US West −0.087 (0.047) 0.064 −0.180 0.005
Canada 0.217 (0.059) 0.000 0.102 0.332
Spain −0.211 (0.113) 0.062 −0.433 0.011
England −0.053 (0.071) 0.457 −0.192 0.086
Singapore −0.114 (0.272) 0.675 −0.647 0.419
Japan −0.044 (0.074) 0.550 −0.188 0.100
China −0.046 (0.093) 0.616 −0.228 0.135
University Reference group
Liberal arts college −0.018 (0.040) 0.663 −0.097 0.062
Community college 0.145 (0.078) 0.063 −0.008 0.299
High school −0.146 (0.078) 0.062 −0.299 0.007
Private school Reference group
Public school 0.033 (0.032) 0.307 −0.030 0.095
Principles of econ Reference group
Intermediate micro 0.042 (0.043) 0.333 −0.043 0.126
Intermediate macro 0.012 (0.043) 0.784 −0.072 0.096
Exp. / Behav. econ 0.064 (0.058) 0.273 −0.050 0.177
Management / Finance 0.071 (0.037) 0.057 −0.002 0.143
Game theory −0.049 (0.125) 0.697 −0.295 0.197
Other classes 0.026 (0.044) 0.545 −0.059 0.112
Morning Reference group
Afternoon 0.030 (0.041) 0.463 −0.051 0.111
Ending point
Asymptote 0.017 (0.006) 0.003 0.006 0.028
R-Squared 0.0966
Observations 138,898
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the session level (# of clusters is 1,672). To compute the clustered




We analyze how markets would converge if they were played multiple times. In particular,
we follow the approach in Gjerstad (2007) to analyze the convergence of volatility and
efficiency using an exponential convergence model. The convergence of the dependent
variable is modeled as:
y(t) = c · t−bη(t)
where y(t) is the dependent variable at period t and η(t) is the random error assumed
to be independent and lognormally distributed. Once we take log on both sides, we can
express the exponential model as the following linear model:
ln[y(t)] = ln(c)− b · ln(t) + ε(t)
where ε(t) is the random error following a normal distribution. Notice that since y(1) = c,
ĉ would be the estimated starting point and b̂ is the estimated speed of convergence. The
estimation results of Smith’s alpha (α(t)) and efficiency loss (1 − E(t)) are shown in
Supplementary Table 14.
The result shows that the initial point of Smith’s alpha is 20.6% (22.5% without con-
trols) and the efficiency loss is 7.7% (10.1% without controls), which are both significantly
different from zero. The significance of b̂ for Smith’s alpha shows a convergence trend.
However, no convergence trend can be found for efficiency loss. Based on these results,
we can estimate Smith’s alpha and efficiency loss if the market were played 25 periods.
Price volatility in period 25 is estimated to be 8.6% (8.8% without controls) and efficiency
loss is predicted to be 8.1% (12.5% without controls). This suggests that price volatility
decreases as the market lasts more periods, but efficiency remains stable across periods.
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Supplementary Table 14: Estimation result of exponential convergence model.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable α(t) α(t) 1− E(t) 1− E(t)
ĉ 0.225 0.206 0.101 0.077
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[0.218, 0.233] [0.175, 0.237] [0.095, 0.106] [0.054, 0.101]
b̂ 0.292 0.270 −0.067 −0.012
(0.000) (0.000) (0.209) (0.802)
[0.234, 0.350] [0.220, 0.320] [−0.171, 0.037] [−0.108, 0.084]
α̂(25) 0.088 0.086
(0.000) (0.000)
[0.072, 0.104] [0.068, 0.104]
1− Ê(25) 0.125 0.081
(0.000) (0.000)
[0.085, 0.165] [0.049, 0.112]
Controls No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.032 0.130 0.001 0.042
Observations 9,021 9,021 9,021 9,021
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the session level (# of clusters is 1,672). P -values are shown
in parentheses and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) appear below the p-value. To compute the clustered
standard errors, We drop two market observations for Political Economy class since they are from the
same market session. The controls contain the experience, number of players in the market, welfare index
(and squared), countries, school types, funding types, class types and time.
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B.3 Theories of Price Formation
In this section, we describe three theories of within-period price dynamics and provide
the corresponding theoretical predictions. These theories are the “Mutual Adjustment”
(MA) model of Wilson (1987), the “Against Nature” (AN) model of Friedman (1991),
and the zero-intelligence algorithm (ZI) proposed by Gode and Sunder (1993). Here we
only summarize the predictions that we test. A more detailed comparison can be found
in Cason and Friedman (1996). For between-period price dynamics, we briefly describe
Easley and Ledyard (1993).
Mutual Adjustment (MA) Wilson (1987) extends the bilateral bargaining model be-
tween a buyer and a seller to the context of multilateral markets. Hence, price dynamics in
the double auction is viewed as a sequential equilibrium of an extensive-form game where
the buyers’ values and the sellers’ costs are drawn from a commonly known joint distri-
bution. Under this framework, buyers and sellers play a waiting game where the players’
impatience arises from the pressure of missing a profitable transaction. Eventually, this
impatience induces some trader to make a bid or ask that has a positive probability to be
accepted in the sequential equilibrium. If the transaction does not happen immediately,
the trader would improve the offer until it is accepted. This improvement process is like
a Dutch auction. Based on this model, we have the following testable predictions:
1. Transaction Partner: The buyers (sellers) with higher values (lower costs) should
transact earlier. That is, the rank-order correlation of buyer’s value (seller’s cost)
and transaction order should be negative (positive). Moreover, once we assume risk
neutrality and symmetry, the rank-order correlation coefficient ρbuyer (ρseller) should
be exactly −1.0 (1.0).
2. Price Dynamics: Price changes are serially uncorrelated. Therefore, the first-order
price change auto-correlation coefficient ρprice is predicted to be 0 in this model.
3. Market Inefficiency: The source of inefficiency is only from that least profitable
(inframarginal) trades are not executed.
Against Nature (AN) Friedman (1991) models the price formation process in double
auctions as a Bayesian game against nature. This framework aligns with the Bertrand
perspective that traders would accept the market offer once it exceeds their own reserva-
tion price. Furthermore, traders are assumed to neglect strategic feedback effects—they
ignore the impact of their own bids and asks on other players’ strategies. Under this
construction, the traders’ problem can be transformed into solving the optimal stopping
point with respect to Nature’s bid and ask generating process. The reservation price
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solves the problem in equilibrium. This theory implies that the transaction order should
be in the order of the buyer and seller’s value and cost, and price change is positively
auto-correlated. These two testable predictions are listed below.
1. Transaction Partner: The buyers (sellers) with higher values (lower costs) should
transact earlier. That is, the rank-order correlation of buyer’s value (seller’s cost)
and transaction order should be negative (positive). Moreover, if we assume risk
neutrality and symmetry, the rank-order correlation coefficient ρbuyer (ρseller) should
be exactly −1.0 (1.0).
2. Price Dynamics: Price changes are positively auto-correlated. Therefore, the first-
order price change auto-correlation coefficient ρprice is predicted to be positive in
this model.
3. Market Inefficiency: The source of inefficiency is mainly from that least profitable
(inframarginal) trades are not executed.
Zero-Intelligence (ZI) To show how efficient the double auction mechanism is, Gode
and Sunder (1993) developed a “zero-intelligence algorithm” where buyers and sellers
make random bids and asks (but avoid losing money). Specifically, the buyer’s bid is
uniformly distributed from 0 to the buyer’s value. Similarly, the seller’s ask is uniformly
distributed from the upper bound to the cost. The construction of ZI algorithm im-
plies that the transaction prices are independently drawn from a distribution that would
change as transactions occur. Since bids and asks are completely random in this envi-
ronment, there is no precise prediction. Yet, we can still infer from the algorithm that it
is slightly more likely that buyers with higher values and sellers with lower costs would
trade earlier (because they can accept offers from a wider range). Moreover, if we assume
that transaction prices come from a fixed distribution, the price change auto-correlation
coefficient is exactly −0.5.1
Although there is no clear prediction about the rank-order correlation coefficients and
the price change auto-correlation, we follow Cason and Friedman (1996) and simulate
the algorithm in our default setting 10,000 times. The simulation results are shown in
Supplementary Figure 8 and the blue circles indicate 95% confidence regions. In this
1Suppose transaction prices pj , j = 1, . . . J , are IID with variance V . We can normalize pj such
that E[pj ] = 0. Therefore, V = E[p2j ] and E[pjpj+1] = E[pj ]E[pj+1] = 0. In this case, the price change
auto-correlation coefficient would be
ρprice =









After some traders complete the transactions and leave the market, the distribution of prices would
change. Yet, the changes in distribution would only have a small effect on ρprice.
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simulation data set, the mean of ρprice is −0.475 (SD = 0.211). On the other hand, the
mean of ρbuyer and ρseller are −0.402 (SD = 0.152) and 0.440 (SD = 0.127), respectively.
Thus, implications of ZI algorithm are:
1. Transaction Partner: The buyers with higher values and the sellers with lower
costs would be slightly more likely to trade earlier. 10,000 simulations predict
ρbuyer = −0.402 and ρseller = 0.440.
2. Price Dynamics: The price change auto-correlation coefficient is predicted (by
10,000 simulations) to be ρprice = −0.475.



































Supplementary Figure 8: Zero-Intelligence algorithm simulation result (N = 10, 000).
Between-Period Price Formation Easley and Ledyard (1993) postulate traders use
the price range of the previous period to form reservation prices they bid up to in a
reduced-form English auction in the current period, but then adjust to their true values
or costs if they fail to make a trade. This model predicts a sequence of decreasing price
ranges across periods, resulting in a distributional shift of rank-order correlation between
periods. Hence, we have:
1. Transaction Partner: The buyers (sellers) with higher values (lower costs) should
transact earlier, but this early tendency diminishes across periods.
2. Price Dynamics: Traders observe the minimum transaction price P t and maximum
transaction price P̄t in period t. In period t+1, this model predicts the prices would





Descriptive statistics In Supplementary Table 15, we provide the descriptive statis-
tics of ρprice, ρbuyer and ρseller in different groups.
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Supplementary Table 15: Descriptive statistics for price formation indices.
ρprice ρbuyer ρseller
N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Overall 8,492 −0.431 0.313 −0.539 0.277 0.518 0.279
Country
US North East 965 −0.440 0.362 −0.507 0.307 0.496 0.297
US Midwest 826 −0.427 0.266 −0.544 0.219 0.513 0.241
US South 2,418 −0.425 0.326 −0.552 0.278 0.541 0.279
US West 2,144 −0.422 0.284 −0.521 0.285 0.513 0.286
Canada 1,620 −0.444 0.306 −0.572 0.254 0.519 0.267
Spain 24 −0.459 0.294 −0.232 0.487 0.263 0.526
England 311 −0.454 0.251 −0.547 0.212 0.498 0.214
Singapore 42 −0.429 0.244 −0.525 0.185 0.466 0.260
Japan 108 −0.428 0.595 −0.370 0.480 0.493 0.411
China 34 −0.415 0.329 −0.553 0.251 0.508 0.315
Type of school
University 7,865 −0.433 0.313 −0.536 0.278 0.514 0.280
Liberal arts college 510 −0.410 0.301 −0.577 0.257 0.582 0.231
Community college 50 −0.445 0.402 −0.520 0.237 0.533 0.291
High school 67 −0.389 0.303 −0.527 0.361 0.501 0.390
Type of funding
Private school 1,656 −0.422 0.324 −0.555 0.286 0.532 0.277
Public school 6,836 −0.433 0.310 −0.535 0.275 0.515 0.279
Type of class
Principles of econ 6,262 −0.432 0.303 −0.544 0.268 0.524 0.269
Intermediate micro 974 −0.424 0.312 −0.567 0.246 0.556 0.242
Intermediate macro 228 −0.447 0.312 −0.517 0.281 0.505 0.310
Exp. / Behav. econ 287 −0.444 0.444 −0.444 0.402 0.444 0.404
Management / Finance 422 −0.417 0.330 −0.521 0.302 0.471 0.307
Game theory 19 −0.402 0.280 −0.597 0.163 0.443 0.289
Political economy 1 −0.275 – −0.750 – 0.607 –
Other classes 299 −0.416 0.347 −0.453 0.342 0.429 0.349
Time
Morning 733 −0.434 0.294 −0.539 0.280 0.509 0.266
Afternoon 7,759 −0.431 0.315 −0.539 0.277 0.519 0.280
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B.4 Market Outcomes in Different Periods
In this subsection, we analyze how the market outcomes would change dynamically if the
market can last for multiple rounds. Specifically, we want to know whether the degree
of under-trading would fall from early to late periods and how the price formation would
adjust across periods. In Supplementary Figure 9, we break down the data into periods 1,
2, 3, and period 4 and beyond. The result shows that no matter which period we look
at, the empirical trend line is pretty close but uniformly lower than the 45-degree line,
which means that under-trading is common regardless of the period.
In Supplementary Figure 10, we split the market by different periods and analyze
how the price formation would adjust across periods. From the figure, we can observe
that price formation is similar across periods but with a small trend that the markets are
moving away from the prediction of Wilson (1987) and Friedman (1991). This trend of
distributional shifts is predicted by Easley and Ledyard (1993).
To test whether the trend is statistically significant, we conduct the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test on the distribution of buyer and seller rank-order correlations. The buyer
rank-order correlation in each period is −0.543, −0.536, −0.534 and −0.506, respectively.
The shift from period 3 to period 4 and beyond is significant with p-value = 0.049 (KS
= 0.0813) but not the shift from period 1 to 2 (p-value = 0.224) and from period 2 to 3
(p-value = 0.429). In addition, the seller rank-order correlation in each period is 0.527,
0.506, 0.517, and 0.472, respectively. The shifts from period 1 to 2 and period 3 to 4
and beyond are significant with p-value = 0.006 (KS = 0.0453) and p-value = 0.015 (KS
= 0.0937). Yet, the shift from period 2 to 3 is not significant with p-value = 0.381. These






























































































Supplementary Figure 9: Equilibrium and empirical trading volume in different periods.
The dotted black line is the 45-degree line and the green solid line is the linear regression
fit. (a) Period 1 (N1 = 5, 793). (b) Period 2 (N2 = 1, 999). (c) Period 3 (N3 = 762).






































































































































Against nature Mutual adjustment Zero intelligence
Supplementary Figure 10: ρbuyer, ρseller and market-level price change auto-correlation
ρprice in different periods (with the average labeled by the red diamond). Theoretical
predictions are depicted Mutual Adjustment (MA, yellow), Against Nature (AN, green)
and Zero-Intelligence (ZI, pink). (a) Period 1 (N1 = 5, 498). (b) Period 2 (N2 = 1, 868).
(c) Period 3 (N3 = 686). (d) Period 4 and beyond (N4+ = 440).
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B.5 Robustness Checks for Price Formation Results
In this section, we first analyze whether and how market size affects market outcomes and
performance. Presumably, the price-taking assumption underlying competitive equilib-
rium theory is less appropriate as the market size decreases. The simplifying assumptions
used in price formation models may also apply less well in small markets. Therefore, we
first break down the data by market size—we compare the price formation processes in
the smallest 5% of the markets (the number of players is less or equal to 6) and the largest
5% of the markets (the number of players is greater or equal to 36).
The results are summarized in Supplementary Table 16 and the distributions are
shown in Supplementary Figure 11. From the table and figures, we can see that although
the average price change autocorrelation is similar, the transaction sequence is closer to
the theoretical prediction of MA and AN in small markets. When the market size is large,
market performance is closer to the predictions of ZI.
Besides these price formation indices, we also analyze the source of inefficiency. ZI
predicts that the inefficiency would only come from transactions involving extra-marginal
trades (EM-Inefficiency). On the other hand, MA and AN predict that the only source
of inefficiency is from profitable trades that are not realized (V-Inefficiency). From
Supplementary Table 16, we can observe that the proportion of EM-inefficiency decreases
when the market size becomes smaller, which is consistent with the smaller markets’
performance being more in line with the predictions of MA and AN.
Secondly, the buyers and sellers are all assumed not to make any trade with negative
profit. The second robustness check we conduct here is to analyze the market perfor-
mance again after filtering out the trades that involved loss to either the buyer or seller.
Supplementary Figure 12 shows the market performance after filtering out loss trades.
The distribution after filtering out loss trades is similar to the original. The trade-
to-trade price change autocorrelation increases slightly from −0.457 to −0.427. At the
market level, the average ρprice = −0.435 (SD = 0.382), ρbuyer = −0.508 (SD = 0.322)
and ρseller = 0.470 (SD = 0.321), which are all close to the original results.
Finally, the price change autocorrelation may also be affected by the “bid-ask bounce”
which could bias the autocorrelation towards −0.5. To check, we compute the trade-
to-trade price change autocorrelation separately for the sequence of accepted bids and
for the sequence of accepted asks. The trade-to-trade price change autocorrelation for
the sequence of accepted bids is −0.412 and is −0.451 for accepted asks. This lack of
shrinkage suggests the original result is robust to the “bid-ask bounce.”
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Supplementary Table 16: Price formation indices for small and large markets.
ρprice ρbuyer ρseller EM
N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Small markets 172 −0.434 0.520 −0.686 0.291 0.667 0.299 0.312 0.427
Large markets 455 −0.415 0.205 −0.423 0.208 0.421 0.240 0.527 0.395



































































Against nature Mutual adjustment Zero intelligence
Supplementary Figure 11: Joint distribution of ρprice, ρbuyer and ρseller. (a) Small markets
(number of players is less than or equal to 6; N = 172). (b) Large markets (number of




























































Supplementary Figure 12: Market performance after filtering out loss trades. (a) The
trade-to-trade price change within a period, correlated with the lagged price change












































Supplementary Figure 13: Trade-to-trade price change autocorrelation. (a) Accepted
bids (N = 55, 947). (b) Accepted asks (N = 49, 070).
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C Heterogeneity Analysis
We report details of the cross-country heterogeneity analysis in this section. We analyze
the heterogeneity in the first period of the default configuration for both the ultimatum
game and the double auction to control for experience and experimental design. In the
ultimatum game, we analyze the heterogeneity in proposal offers and acceptance rates.
In double auctions, we study the heterogeneity of the first and the last price in a market
period.
We apply the DerSimonian-Laird random-effects model of meta-analysis and calcu-
late the I2 statistic, which shows the proportion of the variability from between-country
heterogeneity. Supplementary Tables 17, 19, 21, 23 and 25 report the means and 95% CIs
in each country for proposal offer, conditional acceptance rates, unconditional acceptance
rates, first transaction price and last transaction price, respectively. Supplementary Ta-
bles 18, 20, 22, 24 and 26 report (for the same five indices) measures of heterogeneity,
including the I2 statistic, the estimated variance of the true means τ̂ 2, as well as the
p-value for the null hypothesis of having no between-country heterogeneity.
Specifically, under the framework of the random-effects model, the mean of country k
is
mk = (µ+ ζk) + ek,
where µ is the true overall mean, ek is the within-country variation (with standard error
sk), independent of the variation of country means which is assumed to be ζk ∼ N(0, τ 2).
This provides the marginal distributionsmk ∼ N(µ, s2k+τ 2). In other words, the random-
effects model assumes the variation in country means comes from not only sampling error,
but also underlying population heterogeneity (between-country variation ζk).2 Thus, our
goal is to quantify the fraction of variation resulting from between-country heterogeneity.
To estimate the fraction, we first need to estimate τ 2 and then the true overall mean
µ. We follow the approach of DerSimonian and Laird (1986) and adopt the method of
moments to estimate τ̂ 2. This is the simplest and most commonly used approach in












whereK is the number of countries in our data set and wk = 1/s2k. Under the assumptions
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2In the fixed effects model, the variation is assumed to be purely from the sampling error, so the
model reduces to mk = µ+ ek.
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As we plug in the moment condition, we obtain












Rearranging the moment condition of τ 2, we can obtain the DerSimonian and Laird
estimate
τ̂ 2DL =








By convention, τ̂ 2DL is replaced with 0 if Q < K − 1. Once we obtain τ̂ 2DL, we can plug









= µ for w∗k =
1
s2k+τ


























After obtaining the estimates of the between-country variance τ̂ 2DL and the overall
mean µ̂DL, we can now compute the fraction that is between-country variation. Intu-
itively, suppose the sampling errors in different countries are the same, i.e. sk = s, then
the unconditional variance of country k is given by
Var(mk) = τ 2 + s2.
Therefore, the fraction of variance that is due to between-country heterogeneity is
i2 =
τ 2
τ 2 + s2
,
which is the true value that we want to estimate. If i2 > 0, then the true means of
different countries are indeed heterogeneous. Here we follow Higgins and Thompson
(2002), defining the I2 statistic to be of the form
I2 =
τ̂ 2DL
τ̂ 2DL + ŝ
2
,
where ŝ2 is an estimate of s2. In the general case, the sampling errors in different countries
would be different. That is, the s2 would be replaced with a set of sampling errors











We can rewrite the definition of the I2 statistic and obtain the following form:
I2 =
(




which is set to be 0 if Q < K − 1. Intuitively, the Q statistic reflects the total amount
of observed variation, and K − 1 is the expectation of Q if there is no between-country
heterogeneity (τ = 0). Thus, Q− (K− 1) is the amount of excess variation, and I2 is the
fraction of variation that is from between-country heterogeneity. Lastly, K−1 is actually
the degree of freedom (df ). As we replace K − 1 with df , we can obtain the form of I2









The results in Supplementary Tables 17 and 18 show that a significant amount of between-
country heterogeneity exists in proposal offers (p < 0.001). In particular, 86.61% of the
variation comes from between-country heterogeneity, and the estimated variance of the
true effect size is 4.26.
Supplementary Table 17: Proposal offers in different countries.
Country Mean [95% CI] Weight (%)
Spain 27.73 25.42 30.04 10.36
China 30.83 26.16 35.50 5.90
US Midwest 35.18 33.73 36.64 12.18
US North East 35.20 34.01 36.38 12.66
Singapore 35.50 30.06 40.94 4.90
England 35.92 33.07 38.77 9.19
US South 36.19 35.28 37.09 13.10
Japan 36.64 32.35 40.93 6.48
Canada 37.30 35.89 38.71 12.26
US West 37.35 36.35 38.35 12.96
Overall effect 35.00 33.50 36.51 100.00
Supplementary Table 18: Heterogeneity measures of proposal offers.
Q df p-value I2 (%) [95% CI] τ̂ 2
67.20 9 0.000 86.61 77.31 92.10 4.26
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C.2 Conditional Acceptance Rate
To compare conditional acceptance rates, we use the estimated coefficients of the following
logistic regression:




where g(·) is the logit function and Dji is the dummy variable of each country. After run-
ning the regression, we compare the heterogeneity in the estimations of country dummy
variables. Notice that the standard errors are calculated by clustering at the session level.
The conditional acceptance rate results in Supplementary Tables 19 and 20 show
insignificant between-country heterogeneity (p = 0.164). In fact, only 30.63% of the
variation comes from between-country heterogeneity, and the estimated variance of the
true effect size is only 0.012.
Supplementary Table 19: Estimations of country dummy variables in the logistic regres-
sion.
Country Mean [95% CI] Weight (%)
England −1.79 −2.09 −1.50 11.61
US West −1.74 −2.00 −1.48 13.65
Canada −1.57 −1.88 −1.26 10.96
Spain −1.57 −1.97 −1.17 7.40
Japan −1.57 −1.96 −1.18 7.75
US South −1.52 −1.75 −1.30 15.88
US North East −1.43 −1.69 −1.17 13.37
US Midwest −1.29 −1.58 −0.99 11.65
China −1.14 −1.76 −0.52 3.53
Singapore −1.08 −1.64 −0.52 4.21
Overall effect −1.52 −1.65 −1.40 100.00
Supplementary Table 20: Heterogeneity measures of acceptance rates.
Q df p-value I2 (%) [95% CI] τ̂ 2
12.97 9 0.164 30.63 0.00 66.85 0.012
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C.3 Unconditional Acceptance Rate
Supplementary Tables 21 and 22 show that the between-country heterogeneity in the
unconditional acceptance rate is not significant (p = 0.072). Among the total variation,
only about 42.98% of variation is from between-country heterogeneity and the estimated
variance of the true unconditional acceptance rate is only 0.0003.
Supplementary Table 21: Unconditional acceptance rate in different countries.
Country Mean [95% CI] Weight (%)
Spain 0.55 0.47 0.63 5.14
England 0.61 0.53 0.70 4.45
US West 0.64 0.61 0.67 18.24
Japan 0.65 0.56 0.74 3.86
China 0.66 0.54 0.77 2.47
Canada 0.66 0.63 0.70 14.89
US South 0.67 0.64 0.69 19.14
US North East 0.67 0.64 0.70 15.71
US Midwest 0.69 0.66 0.73 13.29
Singapore 0.71 0.60 0.82 2.81
Overall effect 0.66 0.64 0.68 100.00
Supplementary Table 22: Heterogeneity measures of unconditional acceptance rate
Q df p-value I2 (%) [95% CI] τ̂ 2
15.78 9 0.072 42.98 0.00 72.69 0.00
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C.4 First Transaction
Supplementary Tables 23 and 24 show that between-country heterogeneity in the first
transaction price is not significant (p = 0.193). Moreover, most of the variation comes
from within-country variance—only 27.28% of the variation is from between-country het-
erogeneity. In fact, the overall average is not significantly different from 0, ranging from
−22% to 9%. Lastly, the estimated variance of the true effect size is less than 0.01.
Supplementary Table 23: First standardized price difference in different countries.
Country Mean [95% CI] Weight (%)
Spain −0.22 −0.65 0.20 0.40
Singapore −0.15 −0.73 0.44 0.22
US South −0.02 −0.05 0.00 31.06
US West −0.02 −0.07 0.02 21.15
England −0.01 −0.14 0.13 3.91
US North East 0.01 −0.05 0.07 13.17
China 0.04 −0.11 0.18 3.22
Canada 0.04 −0.01 0.09 18.61
Japan 0.08 −0.17 0.32 1.21
US Midwest 0.09 −0.01 0.18 7.04
Overall effect 0.00 −0.02 0.03 100.00
Supplementary Table 24: Heterogeneity measures of first standardized price difference.
Q df p-value I2 (%) [95% CI] τ̂ 2
12.38 9 0.193 27.28 0.00 65.05 0.00
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C.5 Last Transaction
The last transaction results in Supplementary Tables 25 and 26 show that the between-
country heterogeneity is also not significant (p = 0.276). Most of the variation is still
from within-country variance—only 18.16% of the variation comes from between-country
heterogeneity, with mean effects ranging from−2% to 13%. Lastly, the estimated variance
of the true effect size is also less than 0.01.
Supplementary Table 25: Last standardized price difference in different countries.
Country Mean [95% CI] Weight (%)
US South −0.02 −0.04 −0.00 34.17
US West −0.01 −0.04 0.01 22.74
Singapore 0.00 −0.27 0.27 0.28
US North East 0.00 −0.03 0.04 15.88
England 0.02 −0.08 0.11 2.36
China 0.02 −0.04 0.09 4.35
Canada 0.02 −0.01 0.06 14.83
US Midwest 0.03 −0.04 0.10 4.52
Spain 0.13 −0.20 0.45 0.20
Japan 0.13 −0.05 0.30 0.68
Overall effect −0.00 −0.02 0.01 100.00
Supplementary Table 26: Heterogeneity measures of last standardized price difference.
Q df p-value I2 (%) [95% CI] τ̂ 2




In this section, we provide the screenshots of each stage in our ultimatum game and
buyer-seller double auction.
Supplementary Figure 14 shows screenshots in the ultimatum game. Supplementary
Figure 14a-c show the Proposers’ screen. At the beginning of the game, the Proposer
would see the amount of money that he can split with the Responder. The Proposer can
then drag the ball in the middle of the screen to make the proposal. After the Responder
makes a decision, the Proposer would see the result screen. Supplementary Figure 14c is
a sample result screen that the player sees if the proposal offer is rejected.
The Responder’s screenshots are shown in Supplementary Figure 14d-e. After the
Proposer makes the proposal offer, the Responder would see the proposed allocation and
decides whether to accept or reject it using the buttons on the screen. After the decision
is made, the players would see the result screen and Supplementary Figure 14e is a sample
result screen when the proposal offer is accepted.
In the buyer-seller double auction, the buyers’ initial screen is shown in Supplementary
Figure 15a and the sellers’ initial screen is in Figure 15d. Both buyers and sellers would
see their values/costs for the commodity as they enter the market. Then, buyers and
sellers can trade in the market by either dragging the slider bar to make an offer or
clicking the button to accept the standing offer (Supplementary Figure 15b for buyers).
Notice that if a player is making a potential trade that would give them negative payoff,
the slider bar would turn red as a warning (Supplementary Figure 15e for sellers). After
a transaction occurs, the player would see the result screen which shows the price and






Supplementary Figure 14: Screenshot in each stage of the ultimatum game. (a) Proposer’s
initial screen. (b) Proposer’s decision screen. (c) Proposer’s result screen. (d) Respon-






Supplementary Figure 15: Screenshot in each stage of the buyer-seller double auction.
(a) Buyer’s initial screen. (b) Buyer’s transaction screen. (c) Buyer’s result screen.
(d) Seller’s initial screen. (e) Seller’s transaction screen. (f) Seller’s result screen. Screen-
shots are reproduced from MobLab with permission.
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